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SUPREME JUDICIAL BULLSHIT
Adam J. Kolber*
ABSTRACT
While we have come to expect bullshit from politicians, there is no
shortage of judicial bullshit either. After discussing Harry Frankfurt's
famous description of bullshit, I illustrate possible instances of judicial
bullshit in a wide range of bioethics cases, mostly at the Supreme Court.
Along the way, we see judges bullshit for many reasons including the desire
to keep precedents malleable, avoid line drawing, hide the arbitrariness of
line drawing, sound important, be memorable, gloss over inconvenient facts,
sound poetic, make it seem like their hands are tied, and appear to address
profound questions without actually staking out provocative positions.
I pay particular attention to the discussion of reproductive rights in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey where the joint opinion authors arguably used
bullshit to deflect attention from the thorny philosophical questions at the
core of rights to choose. Such deflection is not necessarily a flaw as some
uses of bullshit may be warranted or even praiseworthy. Whether we applaud
or condemn the phenomenon, however, judicial bullshit does reduce
transparency, and scholars, journalists, and other judges sometimes take
bullshit more seriously than perhaps they should.
INTRODUCTION
Our government has been accused of producing too little prosperity,
equality, and justice. But it has never been accused of producing too little
bullshit. Famed reporter Carl Bernstein has said of Donald Trump that "[n]o
president, including Richard Nixon, has been so ignorant of fact and disdains
fact in the way" Trump does.' One commentator described Trump as a
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For helpful comments, I thank Ryan Calo, John
Cogan, Adam Elga, Nada Gligorov, Hank Greely, Christopher Hernandez, Moshe Hoffman,
Simone Lamont, Stephen Latham, Kimberly Mutcherson, Govind Persad, and Laurent Sacharoff,
as well as participants at workshops at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Seton Hall
Law School, and Stanford Law School.
1. Alexandra King, Carl Bernstein: Donald Trump Has 'Disdain for the Truth,' CNN
(Dec. 11, 2016, 3:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/11/us/bernstein-on-trumps-disdain-
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"bullshit artist" who "proudly moves through the world without ever
bothering to consider how concepts of truth or falsehood might potentially
shape his behavior." 2
That same commentator claims that "law is the very opposite of bullshit."3
To her, law is "a highly systematized structure of meaning used to evaluate
the merit and relevance of facts and arguments. In that same capacity, it's
also a way of regulating which statements are valid understandings of reality
or legal text and which are beyond the pale."' Yet, as I will suggest, there is
no shortage of judicial bullshit.
You might think that judges, especially those with life tenure, could
dispense with bullshit. There are many reasons, however, why judges
bullshit, some of them quite strategic. It's not easy for judges to resolve
contentious issues that have flummoxed lawyers and ethicists for decades.
Bullshit can help judges appear to address profound questions without
actually staking out provocative positions. Indeed, judicial bullshit may
sometimes provide the best path forward.
Judicial bullshit is often easiest to spot when judges wax philosophical;
hence many of the clearest exemplars come from bioethics cases. Consider,
for example, these two sentences from the U.S. Supreme Court's joint
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which reaffirmed the fundamental
constitutional right to abortion: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."'
If you teach constitutional law or health law, you've probably read this
passage many times. But have you ever stopped to figure out what it means?
It seems to express a lofty commitment to personal liberty, indirectly
associating abortion rights with the most fundamental aspects of our
humanity.
cnntv/index.html; see also Harry G. Frankfurt, Donald Trump is BS, Says Expert in BS, TIME
(May 12, 2016), http://time.com/4321036/donald-trump-bs/.
2. Quinta Jurecic, On Bullshit and the Oath of Office: The "LOL Nothing Matters"
Presidency, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://1awfareblog.com/bullshit-and-oath-
office-lol-nothing-matters-presidency. Jurecic refers here to "bullshit" as the term is used by
Harry Frankfurt. See discussion infra Part I.
3. Jurecic, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Justice Antonin Scalia bemoaned the passage's "exalted"
language. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). When
it was later cited by the majority in the groundbreaking case of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
574 (2003), the passage was apparently of such renown that Scalia called it the "famed sweet-
mystery-of-life passage." Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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On closer reading, however, the passage makes little sense. It claims that
the most important aspect of liberty is the "right to define [a] concept." But a
right to define a concept, while a kind of liberty, is certainly not "at the heart
of liberty." Governments rarely seek to limit people's rights to define
concepts.6 Inside your own head, you can define concepts however you'd
like. Liberty is more centrally concerned not with our freedom to define
concepts but with the sorts of actions we are permitted to take without
interference from others. If Casey were merely about rights to define
concepts, it would be of greater interest to metaphysicians than actual
physicians.
And what does it mean to have a right to define one's own concept of the
mystery of human life? People are far more likely to debate the mystery of
human life than the concept of the mystery of human life. Perhaps the Justices
meant that we should be free to reach our own conclusions about the
mysteries of life, but it would have been much more straightforward just to
say that. And again, the passage concerns liberties associated with freedom
of thought rather than the liberties of bodily autonomy that are at the heart of
the abortion debate.
Lastly, it's not clear precisely what "these matters" refers to in the second
sentence. Presumably, these matters are existence, meaning, and the universe
and not rights to define concepts of these things. Still, beliefs about existence,
meaning, and the universe aren't the sorts of things typically thought to
"define" attributes of personhood. Attributes of personhood are usually
qualities that entitle people to basic rights. For example, perhaps abilities to
feel pain, be self-aware, or form complex desires constitute attributes of
personhood. But how can beliefs about existence, meaning, or the universe
(or beliefs about rights to define such concepts) constitute attributes of
personhood? Surely humans with no beliefs about these things still have
rights to life.
"So what," you might say, "if the Justices would fail their Philosophy 101
exams?" Maybe the quoted passage isn't meant to be picked apart for putative
philosophical content; maybe it's only meant to set the ambience for the joint
opinion. But that's precisely my point. The joint opinion is cloaked in
philosophical language, but the authors often seem unconcerned with the
truth or falsity of their statements in just the way, as we will see, philosopher
Harry Frankfurt famously characterized bullshit. The joint opinion references
lofty ideas without wrestling in any careful way with those ideas.
6. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have never heard of a law that
attempted to restrict one's 'right to define' certain concepts."). On possible First Amendment
protections of freedom of thought, see Adam J. Kolber, Two Views of First Amendment Thought
Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 1381, 1386-96 (2016).
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How tragic, it may seem, that the authors should get a failing grade in
philosophy in one of the most philosophically rich and important cases in the
nation's history. But while it's possible the joint opinion authors simply
lacked the acumen to evaluate what they wrote or failed to carefully compose
or edit their prose, the case is so important and closely-scrutinized that the
failure to make clear, precise statements might have been exactly what was
intended.
I will argue that, among many potentially overlapping reasons, judges
sometimes resort to bullshit to: keep precedents malleable, avoid line
drawing, hide the arbitrariness of line drawing, sound important, be
memorable, gloss over inconvenient facts, sound poetic, seem as though their
hands are tied, and seem principled rather than strategic. I make no strong
claims about whether or when courts ought to bullshit, but there are probably
appropriate occasions.
At the same time, bullshit lacks transparency, and we should avoid it
absent good reason. The "mystery passage" above is quoted in full in
hundreds of law review articles and many court opinions,' including famous
cases such as Lawrence v. Texas,' Washington v. Glucksberg,9 and People v.
Kevorkian.o Rather than recognizing bullshit for what it is, the vast majority
of these scholarly and judicial sources seem to endorse its content. They take
the passage to actually mean something with genuine legal implications."
Indeed, if judges believe the passage has legal implications, then in fact it
probably does. But given the lack of transparency underlying bullshit, judges
and scholars should pay keen attention to its use to see what may be hiding
in the background.
In Part I, I discuss Frankfurt's understanding of bullshit and illustrate
possible instances of judicial bullshit in a wide range of bioethics cases,
especially those decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Part II, I examine
several potential instances of bullshit in the joint opinion in Planned
7. As of February 12, 2018, a search of Westlaw's Secondary Sources database, filtered
for publication type "Law Reviews & Journals," shows 461 law reviews, and Westlaw's database
of federal and states cases finds thirty-six.
8. 539 U.S. at 574.
9. 521 U.S. 702, 726-27 (1997).
10. 527 N.W.2d 714, 727 (Mich. 1994).
11. See Trent L. Pepper, The "Mystery ofLife" in the Lower Courts: The Influence of the
Mystery Passage on American Jurisprudence, 51 How. L.J. 335, 335-36 (2008) (collecting
judicial and scholarly sources); id. at 347 tbl.3 (finding that just over 10% of judicial references
to the "mystery passage" were critical). Some commentators, however, have indeed called out the
passage. For example, Michael McConnell has deemed it a "faux philosophic argument." Michael
W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665,
669. John Garvey claims it resembles a "bad freshman philosophy paper" but still thinks it
expresses a coherent notion. John H. Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
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Parenthood v. Casey to show the role bullshit can play more broadly in a
single opinion. Casey concerns the particularly controversial issue of abortion
and arguably uses bullshit to deflect attention from the thorny philosophical
questions at its core. I don't take a position as to whether the joint opinion
should be applauded or condemned for its apparent reliance on bullshit, but I
do highlight ways in which judicial bullshit reduces transparency in ways that
may be troublesome.
The composition of the Supreme Court may change dramatically in the
coming years, and many of the Court's apparently-settled constitutional cases
will reopen for debate in ways that few scholars predicted. Now is a
particularly timely opportunity to reexamine the philosophical arguments
underpinning those and other decisions to see where bullshit must be replaced
by careful argumentation and where bullshit might be the best we can hope
for.
I. JUDICIAL BULLSHIT
A. The Nature ofBullshit
In a now-famous essay, philosopher Harry Frankfurt sought to "begin the
development of a theoretical understanding of bullshit."12 Though "bullshit"
is sometimes just a "generic term of abuse" that is "vast and amorphous," 3
Frankfurt believed it possible to elucidate the concept "even though it is not
likely to be decisive" for "[e]ven the most basic and preliminary questions
about bullshit remain, after all, not only unanswered but unasked."14
According to Frankfurt, bullshit is often pretentious' and phony. 6 It is
paradigmatically different than lying because liars are trying to deceive. 7
Bullshitters, by contrast, are unconcerned or insufficiently concerned with the
truth of their statements. They describe "a certain state of affairs without
genuinely submitting to the constraints which the endeavor to provide an
accurate representation of reality imposes."" It's not merely that they "fail[]
12. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, On Bullshit, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT
117, 117 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 119 (.'[P]retentious bullshit' is close to being a stock phrase.").
16. Id. at 128 ("[T]he essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony.").
17. Id. at 118.
18. Id. at 125 (discussing a particular alleged instance of bullshit in a conversation between
Fania Pascal and Ludwig Wittgenstein).
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to get things right" but that they are "not even trying." 9 The bullshitter's
speech "is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor, as a lie must be, in
a belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with
truth-this indifference to how things really are-that [Frankfurt] regard[s]
as of the essence of bullshit."20
Moreover, Frankfurt believes that, like liars, bullshitters are hiding
something. What bullshitters hide is their lack of concern for the truth:
This is the crux of the distinction between [the bullshitter] and
the liar. Both he and the liar represent themselves falsely as
endeavoring to communicate the truth. The success of each depends
upon deceiving us about that. But the fact about himself that the liar
hides is that he is attempting to lead us away from a correct
apprehension of reality; we are not to know that he wants us to
believe something he supposes to be false. The fact about himself
that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth-values
of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not
to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to
conceal it ....
It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows
the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction. A person
who lies is thereby responding to the truth, and he is to that extent
respectful of it. When an honest man speaks, he says only what he
believes to be true; and for the liar, it is correspondingly
indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the
bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side
of the true nor on the side of the false.2 '
Frankfurt's description of bullshit captures at least much of what we mean
by the term and shows how bullshit can differ from lying. For Frankfurt, the
essence of bullshit is expression made with insufficient concern for the truth,
coupled with, as I read him, a certain attitude of insufficient concern for the
truth. To be sure, bullshit can have other meanings, as Frankfurt later
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id. at 130-32.
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acknowledged.2 2 But I will take up his famous definition, filling in some gaps
where necessary, but without special effort to make improvements. 23
Notice that Frankfurtian bullshit need not have the negative connotation
that "bullshit" has in common parlance. Indeed, Frankfurt states that his essay
does "not consider the rhetorical uses and misuses of bullshit," 24 reflecting, it
seems, Frankfurt's belief that there might be appropriate uses of bullshit.25
Unlike Frankfurt, I will largely focus on these rhetorical uses and misuses. In
particular, I will examine how courts opining on bioethical issues, especially
the U.S. Supreme Court, make use of bullshit for reasons of convenience and
strategy.
B. Bullshit in Multi-Authored Court Opinions
Given the difficulty of detecting insufficient concern for the truth,
identifying bullshit will always be subject to error and is particularly
challenging in judicial contexts. We may know when our friends and family
are bullshitting, but most of us lack intimate acquaintance with the knowledge
and attitudes of particular judges.
Compounding the problem, appellate opinions, especially at the Supreme
Court, almost always have multiple, sometimes uncredited, authors. Some
opinions, including the opinion in Casey that I will focus on, are explicitly
authored by more than one Justice. Even those written by a single Justice will
often have revisions proposed by other Justices either as friendly suggestions
or as conditions for a Justice to sign on to a proposed opinion. Moreover,
many Justices rely on their law clerks to draft or substantially revise opinions.
22. Harry Frankfurt, Reply to G.A. Cohen, in CONTOURS OF AGENCY 340, 340-41 (Sarah
Buss & Lee Overton eds., 2002).
23. A lot turns on what Frankfurt means by insufficient concern with truth. One might argue
that even communication with little regard for truth may not be insufficiently concerned with truth
so long as it is morally justified by broader goals. But interpreting "insufficient concern" as a
moral criterion means that only morally unjustified communication could possibly constitute
bullshit. By contrast, I think Frankfurtian "insufficient concern" refers not to moral considerations
but to norms or expectations of accuracy in communication. See FRANKFURT, supra note 12, at
125 (stating that bullshitters do not "genuinely submit[] to the constraints which the endeavor to
provide an accurate representation of reality imposes"). Hence, an expression could be bullshit
relative to communicative norms even if it is morally justified all things considered. For efforts
to refine the meaning of bullshit, see, for example, BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY: GUARANTEED TO
GET PERFECT RESULTS EVERY TIME (Gary L. Hardcastle & George A. Reisch eds., 2006)
[hereinafter BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY]; Andreas Stokke & Don Fallis, Bullshitting, Lying, and
Indifference Toward Truth, 4 ERGO 277 (2017).
24. FRANKFURT, supra note 12, at 117.
25. Perhaps such instances are rare in his mind as he also states that "[c]haracterizing
something as bullshit is naturally construed as seriously pejorative." Frankfurt, supra note 22, at
343.
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Any published Supreme Court opinion is likely the product of multiple
authors, each with different levels of involvement, and perhaps, different
levels of concern for the truth.
Frankfurt says nothing about the nature of multi-authored bullshit, so
we're necessarily stretching his conception. In the pages that follow, I will
often speak of "bullshit candidates"-statements that seem like one or more
authors were bullshitting. Because Supreme Court opinions are usually vetted
by smart people with strong verbal and analytical skills, at least some
candidate bullshit seems not the result of mere error or oversight but of
intentional strategy. Considering how hard it is to characterize the level of
concern for truth among a group of authors, however, we can rarely, if ever,
be certain.
C. The Mens Rea ofBullshit
Frankfurt doesn't precisely specify which mental states, or lack thereof,
are required for some communication to represent bullshit. For example, does
a bullshitter need to know that she's bullshitting? Or could someone try to
speak the truth yet nevertheless utter bullshit due to an objective deficiency
in effort or ability to speak the truth? While Frankfurt believes bullshitters
reflect "indifference to how things really are,"26 it's not obvious whether
Frankfurtian bullshit can be inadvertent.27
Either way, mere mistakes that evidence insufficient concern for the truth
probably do not qualify as bullshit. Bullshitters need to have an attitude of
indifference to the truth. For example, the Supreme Court made one of its
more widely publicized slip-ups in Kennedy v. Louisiana.2 8 In that case, the
Court deemed the death penalty unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
26. FRANKFURT, supra note 12, at 125.
27. Speaking of the meaning of "bull," Frankfurt writes in a footnote that "[i]t may be noted
that the inclusion of insincerity among its essential conditions would imply that bull cannot be
produced inadvertently; for it hardly seems possible to be inadvertently insincere." FRANKFURT,
supra note 12, at 127 n.5. He goes on to say, however, that while speaking of bull as "insincere"
is helpful "it needs to be sharpened," id. at 127, and it's not clear that Frankfurt considers "bull"
and "bullshit" synonymous.
G.A. Cohen believed that Frankfurtian bullshit could not be inadvertent and criticized
Frankfurt's description of bullshit for that reason. G.A. Cohen, Deeper into Bullshit, in BULLSHIT
AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 23, at 121. Cohen argued that we also use the term "bullshit" to refer
to nonsensical language that needn't make "reference to the bullshit-producer's state of mind."
Id.
28. 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Editorial, Supreme Slip-Up, WASH. POST (July 5, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/04/AR2008070402146.html.
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punishment for the crime of child rape. 29 As part of the majority's claim that
the punishment would be unusual and run counter to the practices of most
death penalty jurisdictions,3 0 the Court initially failed to recognize that U.S.
military law at the time permitted the execution of child rapists.3 ' Justice
Scalia believed the missing information devastated the majority's claim to a
national consensus against executing child rapists. 3 2
But even if the Court's omission of federal military law showed
insufficient concern for the truth, it doesn't necessarily make assertions in the
opinion bullshit. Mere forgetfulness or insufficient research by an otherwise
conscientious speaker does not equate to bullshit. Indeed, in this particular
case, the relevant information apparently eluded all relevant parties,
including dissenting Justices, counsel for both the convicted rapist and the
state of Louisiana, and writers of ten amicus briefs.33
Moreover, the bar for identifying bullshit of omission may be higher than
the bar for bullshit of commission (if bullshit by omission is even possible).
The Court has certainly made errors of commission as well: a ProPublica
study found that seven of twenty-four recent Supreme Court opinions
containing legislative facts had factual errors.34 But unless we deem the kinds
of errors sufficiently egregious, they probably do not constitute bullshit.
Perhaps bullshit requires not only insufficient concern for the truth but
insufficient concern for the speaker's insufficient concern. In other words,
bullshit may require a kind of second-order insufficient concern.35 So, had a
Justice or clerk insufficiently researched federal death penalty law when
29. 554 U.S. at 413.
30. Id. at 426.
31. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 945 (2008) (mem.) (denying a petition for rehearing
but modifying the Court's earlier opinion to note that "[w]hen issued and announced on June 25,
2008, the Court's decision neither noted nor discussed the military penalty for rape under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice"); see also Supreme Slip-Up, supra note 28 (noting the bill was
from 2006).
32. "[L]et there be no doubt that [the error] utterly destroys the majority's claim to be
discerning a national consensus and not just giving effect to the majority's own preference. As
noted in [a] letter from Members of Congress, the [2006] bill providing the death penalty for child
rape passed the Senate 95-0; it passed the House 374-41, with the votes of a majority of each
State's delegation; and was signed by the President." Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 947 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (supporting denial of rehearing on other grounds).
33. Supreme Slip-Up, supra note 28.
34. Ryan Gabrielson, It's a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren't Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-court-errors-are-not-hard-
to-find.
35. Cf Donald Fallis, Frankfurt Wasn't Bullshitting!, 37 Sw. PHIL. STUD. 11, 12 (2015)
(suggesting "that an assertion is bullshit if the speaker lacks a concern for the inquiry getting to
the truth").
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usually quite conscientious, the error might not represent bullshit. But if the
writer was insufficiently concerned about substantive law and insufficiently
concerned about the process of identifying substantive law, the bullshit
moniker would be more applicable.
If my comments so far fairly interpret Frankfurt or represent friendly
amendments, we should perhaps recognize a form of negligent bullshit.
Hanlon's razor advises us to "[n]ever attribute to malice that which is
adequately explained by stupidity," or, more diplomatically, "[d]on't assume
bad intentions over neglect and misunderstanding."36 In the judicial context,
some candidate bullshit is not motivated by deliberate attempts to play fast
and loose with the truth but arises from the failure to develop adequate norms
to identify the truth.
Moreover, it would be unfair to hold judges to the same epistemological
standards as scholars. Most scholars can quite freely choose the subjects on
which they focus and have substantial leeway in deciding how much time to
spend on any particular topic. Most courts have no such luxury. They usually
have substantial dockets with heavy caseloads. Even Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, though only obligated to hear cases in which four of nine
Justices vote to grant certiorari,3 7 likely write about far more topics per year
than most scholars. Justices are also more limited than scholars in terms of
the kinds of empirical and experimental data they can gather to resolve
important questions. So it is no surprise that judges are sometimes called
upon to address matters that they would rather ignore or are incompetent to
address. Frankfurt fittingly explains why bullshit is common in the public
sphere:
Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to
talk without knowing what he is talking about. Thus the production
of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person's obligations or
opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than his
knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic. This
discrepancy is common in public life, where people are frequently
impelled-whether by their own propensities or by the demands of
others-to speak extensively about matters of which they are to
some degree ignorant.38
36. Naomi Karten, Don't Assume Bad Intentions When There May Be Another Explanation,
TECHWELL: INSIGHTS (May 15, 2017), https://www.techwell.com/techwell-
insights/2017/05/don-t-assume-bad-intentions-when-there-may-be-another-explanation.
37. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2018).
38. FRANKFURT, supra note 12, at 132-33.
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But judges often exude confidence in their proclamations even when they
lack the resources to competently issue them. Such fakery can often be
characterized as bullshit, despite being motivated by genuine resource
limitations. Faced with the choice of painstakingly defending a controversial
position or admitting uncertainty due to time or other constraints, courts
sometimes do neither; they bullshit to retain the veneer of omniscience.
D. Five Strategic Reasons for Judicial Bullshit
In this section, I discuss five strategic uses of judicial bullshit and give a
possible example of each. We will see more such uses later when we take a
closer look at Planned Parenthood v. Casey. These strategic uses of bullshit
raise genuine questions about when, if ever, judges ought to bullshit in order
to further the demands of justice or other important values.
1. Malleability
One reason courts bullshit is to maintain flexibility. Clear, firm statements
of the law limit courts' discretion. The motivation to maximize flexibility
seems particularly apparent when the Supreme Court considers what qualifies
as a fundamental right protected by substantive due process under the
Constitution. It's very difficult to determine, perhaps partly by design,
exactly which rights will be deemed fundamental and which will not.
Example: Washington v. Glucksberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg, respondents claimed that we have a
fundamental right to physician aid-in-dying.39 The Supreme Court offered the
following test of whether a right to physician aid-in-dying-and any other
right-is protected by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process:
Bullshit Candidate: [T]he Due Process Clause specially protects
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed."4 0
39. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708 (1997).
40. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
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The passage speaks of "rights and liberties." In many contexts, and as
seems to be the case here, these words are used synonymously. 41 Certainly
nothing in the opinion suggests otherwise. So, skipping some intervening
words, we learn one requirement for a liberty to be protected by substantive
due process is that the liberty must be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."
At this point, our bullshit detectors are firing warning signals. On a quick
read, at least, this requirement seems circular, using the word "liberty" to
define itself. But the term "ordered" is used to qualify "liberty." One
dictionary defines "ordered liberty" as "freedom limited by the need for order
in society." 4 2 The notion of "ordered liberty" seems to imply that not all
liberty is good or in need of promotion. Some liberty limitations are necessary
for the general good. So perhaps the Court narrowly avoids circularity by
distinguishing liberty from ordered liberty.
Unfortunately, the Court's meaning is still muddled. The Court instructs
us that it is not enough for some liberty in dispute to be an "ordered liberty."
Rather, it has to be a liberty implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Hence
the Court's test requires us to know which liberties are implicit in the concept
of liberties-consistent-with-a-free-but-responsible society.
I doubt that any particular liberty is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. Suppose I told you to bring any bread for lunch that is implicit in the
concept of healthy bread. Would whole wheat bread satisfy the request? I
don't think so. While whole wheat bread might be a kind of healthy bread,
nothing about whole wheat is implicit in the concept of healthy bread. If, for
example, the medical community univocally determined that whole wheat is
unhealthy, we'd still have a concept of what healthy bread is; it simply
wouldn't include whole wheat bread in the category. If whole wheat bread is
a healthy bread, it is a contingent nutritional fact, not something implicit in
the concept of healthy bread. 43 And just as no particular bread is implicit in
the concept of healthy bread, there is quite possibly no particular liberty
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. We can understand the concept of
ordered liberty without referring to any particular liberty.4
41. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Three Essays on Proportionality Doctrine 3 (Harvard Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 16-43, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2818860
(stating that "in many contexts the terms ['right' and 'liberty'] are interchangeable").
42. MERRIA1M-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 344 (1996).
43. Stating what is implicit in the concept of healthy bread is no easy task. The concept of
healthy bread might include notions of tasting a certain way, having certain texture or ingredients,
being generally edible, having only certain effects on the body, being capable of receiving
condiment spreads, and so on.
44. For more on the nature of concepts, see Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 17, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/.
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So far, it seems, the candidate passage is arguably insufficiently concerned
with truth: the authors offered a possibly empty description of liberty by
failing to explain how an "ordered" liberty differs from any other and then
added a confusing, seemingly unnecessary implicit-in-a-concept
requirement.
More troubling, though, than the discussion of ordered liberty is the further
requirement that rights protected by substantive due process be so
fundamental that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." This non-existence requirement is absurdly overdemanding. It's
one thing to say that there are no fundamental rights and no such thing as
substantive due process. That would shift current law dramatically, but its
meaning would be straightforward. The Court opts instead for the bullshit
approach, laying out a path to declaring a fundamental right that is so
implausible that it's hard to believe the authors of the passage cared about its
truth.
As important as our fundamental right to use contraceptives is, for
example, one cannot believe that liberty and justice would not exist without
it. Surely liberty and justice existed in this country prior to the Court's
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 5 even if our liberty was more
constrained than it ought to have been. Requiring that liberty and justice be
incapable of existing to anoint something a fundamental right sets the bar
preposterously high. And the bullshit can have consequences. For example,
the high bar in Glucksberg was noted in dissent from the view that same-sex
marriage is constitutionally protected.46
When the Court grants the next fundamental right, it will likely do so in a
case where a person was deemed by a lower court to lack the right at issue.
That future Supreme Court will implicitly say that liberty and justice did not
exist before the Court deemed the litigant's right fundamental. Hence, we will
apparently taste no liberty nor justice until the Court has identified the last
fundamental right that someone has been deprived of. One wonders why
we're fighting so quixotically for liberty and justice when the Court implies
that they have been and may always be unattainable.
45. 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting married couples from using
contraceptives unconstitutionally violated penumbral constitutional rights to privacy). Even if
Griswold did not apply the same fundamental rights test that Glucksberg did, it seems unlikely
that the Glucksberg Court doubted that Griswold would satisfy the current test. See Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); see also id. at 762-65 (Souter, J., concurring).
46. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606, 2618 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The fundamental rights test in Glucksberg is derived from Justice
Benjamin Cardozo's decision in Palko v. Connecticut.47 In the relevant
portion of Palko, Cardozo explained how to determine whether a right against
the federal government under Fifth Amendment due process is also a right
against state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 8 Cardozo
argued that "freedom of thought and speech"4 9 certainly qualifies; rights to
think and to express ourselves are so fundamental that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.""o While Cardozo did indeed pick
out an important right, it seems doubtful that the absence of the right
obliterates all liberty and justice. We can identify instances of liberty and
justice even in, say, countries that sharply limit freedom of thought and
expression.
Cardozo seemed to recognize the hyperbolic nature of his test for, just a
bit later, he describes freedom of thought and expression as "the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."" In other
words, he has already toned down the test from the candidate passage by
saying not that liberty would not exist without freedom of thought and
expression, but only that nearly every form of liberty would not exist. If
liberty and justice really would not exist without freedom of thought and
expression, Cardozo wouldn't need the "nearly" qualification.
The main problem, of course, is that Cardozo and others are focusing on
the existence of liberty and justice rather than their quantities.52 Amounts of
liberty and justice spread across a spectrum. The more we restrict liberty, the
less liberty we have. But the test of whether anything is a fundamental liberty
cannot be whether or not its loss would eviscerate all other liberties.
Maybe the Court in Glucksberg was saying that if we had no fundamental
liberties at all, liberty and justice would not exist. I doubt this is a true
statement about the nature of liberty and justice, but even if it were, it's hard
to understand the sort of test the Court would have established. Would we
determine if something is a fundamental right by asking whether liberty and
47. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
48. Id. at 323-25.
49. Id. at 326-27.
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
52. Cf Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 85, 95-
96 (2008). See generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655
(2014); Adam J. Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 275 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) [hereinafter Kolber, Smoothing
Vague Laws]; Adam J. Kolber, The Bumpiness of Criminal Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 855 (2016)
(arguing that criminal law often relies on all-or-nothing determinations rather than smooth input-
output relationships between culpability and amount of punishment).
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justice would still exist if we retained the right at issue but lost all other
fundamental rights? To determine if we have a right to physician-assisted
suicide, would we ask whether liberty and justice would still exist if we lost
all other fundamental rights but retained the right to physician-assisted
suicide? That would be a strange test indeed. The candidate statement would
be bullshit for making it seem like it gave us a real test when no such thing
was actually offered. More importantly, this does not appear to be the test the
Court had in mind. Indeed, in Palko, the Court seemed to apply the
fundamental rights test to freedom of thought and speech as a single right
without considering all other fundamental rights that have or ever will be
recognized.
To be sure, few issues rile people up as much as substantive due process.
For this reason, the field is a bullshit magnet, as the Court is reluctant to speak
precisely on such a controversial and potentially alienating topic. Thus, we
are left with assertions about substantive due process that are practically
incomprehensible. Even Cardozo, as I showed, didn't take his own test
seriously, qualifying it almost immediately.
2. To Avoid Line Drawing
Perhaps the most important task for courts is to draw legal lines. Judges
must consider conduct that harms or has other undesirable properties that fall
along a spectrum and say "here the conduct is lawful, and here it is not." It's
a notoriously difficult task because, even though many will agree that the
properties of the activity fall along a spectrum of severity, they will disagree
about where the legal dividing line should be. Sometimes it's easier to simply
pretend that there is no plausible line to draw.
Example: McFall v. Shimp
In McFall v. Shimp,53 McFall was dying from a bone marrow disease and
sought an injunction to require his cousin, Shimp, to donate bone marrow that
could save McFall's life.54 The Court of Common Pleas in Allegheny County,
53. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Ct. Com. P1. 1978).
54. Id.; see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990) (identifying the McFall parties as
cousins).
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Pennsylvania described Shimp's refusal as "morally indefensible"" but
declined to order the injunction. McFall died soon after the court's decision. 56
In defense of its view, the court recognized that "[t]he common law has
consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no
legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save another human being or
to rescue."57 So put, this description of the law overgeneralizes.58 But even if
the court correctly decided the law, we can still question the court's further
claim that its solution is the morally appropriate one. The court arguably
veers toward bullshit when it suggests that no other solution would be
practical and consistent with our country's values:
Bullshit Candidate: For our law to compel defendant to submit to
an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle
upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would
know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be
drawn.59
Let's start with the second sentence. The court says that if it required
Shimp to make the donation, the court would be crafting a rule that "would
know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn."
This sentence seems like bullshit. Whether the rule would know no limits
depends on the rule that is crafted. Lots of courts create rules and set limits;
this court has simply declined to do so. For example, the court could have
said, "Where we can save a life by minimally intruding on bodily integrity
with no expectation of long-term negative effects, the state is permitted to
conduct the minimal intrusion." That rule would set some limits on the state
and not necessarily preclude the invasion in this case. Moreover, it would be
consistent with other areas of the law that permit invasions of bodily integrity
for arguably less important aims, as where the state is permitted to remove a
bullet from a person against his will if the invasion is relatively minor and
could have significant value in a criminal investigation.60
55. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91.
56. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI, & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 672 (8th ed. 2013).
57. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91.
58. For example, one can be criminally prosecuted for failing to aid those to whom one owes
a legal duty of care. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
59. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91.
60. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) ("The reasonableness of surgical
intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the
procedure."); cf United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding no
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Of course, none of this means that the court reached the wrong result.
Maybe we need an absolute prohibition on such invasions. Or maybe we
don't, but this case still fails to justify invasion. The point is that even if the
case was correctly decided, the court could have crafted a more permissive
rule with some limits, vague as they might have been. Indeed, we can
certainly "imagine where the line would be drawn." If we could save a life
with only ten hairs from Shimp's bushy scalp, the case might have and
perhaps should have come out the other way. If the state can involuntarily tax
our labor, draft us into military combat, remove criminal evidence from our
bodies, and conduct unconsented-to autopsies on our remains, the state can
plausibly remove a few pieces of hair against our will. Whether it ought to
allow forced bone marrow donation is a tougher question but not because we
are radically incapable of drawing limits.
Returning to the first sentence in the passage, the court says that the
requested intrusion "would change every concept and principle upon which
our society is founded." This sounds like overgeneralized bullshit. Would a
law that permitted limited bodily intrusions change the principle that the
federal government should have limited powers? That we have rights to free
speech and free thought? That we shouldn't tax people unless they have
representation in government? The candidate statement is clearly hyperbolic
because a rule that permitted limited intrusions on bodily integrity would
leave many of our founding concepts and principles untouched, at least in the
minds of many, and the court says nothing to show otherwise.
Even if the court correctly precluded the intrusion here, it's not because
an alternative conclusion would rip apart the fabric of society. Painting such
a picture makes its choice seem binary (allow all bodily intrusions or none)
perhaps to hide the availability of the more difficult task of setting boundaries
along a spectrum.
3. To Sound Grand and Important
Judicial opinions sometimes like to wave the flag and sound high-minded
in the process. You would think judges could do so while still trying to speak
truthfully. But perhaps there's something about high-minded flag-waving
rhetoric that seems more effective when the flag-waving is especially frenetic
and the high-mindedness implausibly high.
violation of the Fourth Amendment when a bullet that could serve as evidence of a crime was
surgically removed against the defendant's will, where the bullet was anatomically superficial
and the surgical intervention comparatively minor).
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Example: Hall v. Florida
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of people
with severe intellectual disabilities.6 ' The Court changed its mind thirteen
years later in Atkins v. Virginia6 2 but never clarified precisely how severe an
intellectual disability must be in order to take capital punishment off the
table.63
At the time the Court considered Hall v. Florida, Florida law required a
person to have an IQ of seventy or lower to be ineligible for the death penalty
on grounds of intellectual disability. 64 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion, which held that Florida's rigid approach creates too much
risk that people with intellectual disabilities will be executed and must allow
for more flexible measurements of intellectual disability. 65
As Kennedy explained, the Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."6 6 Eighth Amendment law famously fills in the meaning of
"cruel and unusual" punishment to protect human dignity by looking to
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 67 Immediately after this discussion, Kennedy offers the following:
Bullshit Candidate: The Eighth Amendment's protection of dignity
reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation
we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the Nation's constant,
unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its
precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force.68
Wait, you've just told us that the Eighth Amendment's protection of
human dignity resides in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and the
meaning of the Clause is constantly evolving. Now you're saying that the
Clause reflects "the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation
we aspire to be." If the meaning of "cruel and unusual" evolves, I see how it
could reflect the Nation we are now and maybe even the nation we aspire to
be. But if its meaning is evolving, it does so precisely so as not to reflect the
61. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). The Court used the term "mental
retardation" in cases prior to Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), but stated in Hall that it was
now using "'intellectual disability' to describe the identical phenomenon." Id at 1990.
62. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
63. Id. at 317 (leaving the matter to states, at least at first, to set boundaries).
64. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1992 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
67. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
68. Id.
SUPREME JUDICIAL BULLSHIT
nation we have been. Kennedy's statement is particularly absurd in the
context of capital punishment for the intellectually disabled. Within a
thirteen-year span, the Court held that we can execute those with severe
intellectual disabilities and then held that we cannot. Are we to believe that
the Eighth Amendment simultaneously reflects what we are, were, and aspire
to be even when they contradict?
There is a sense, of course, in which Eighth Amendment law can reflect a
contradictory past and present. To understand the Amendment, courts surely
examine prior cases. In this limited sense, prior cases, even when they
conflict, can be viewed as contributing to the overall meaning of the
Amendment. But if Kennedy is merely noting that the meaning of the
Amendment reflects various stages in its history, that will be true of
practically all constitutional doctrine. So the first sentence in this bullshit-
candidate passage is either false (since the doctrine cannot embody a
contradiction) or patently obvious (since it applies to virtually all laws).
The second sentence in the bullshit-candidate passage states: "This is to
affirm that the Nation's constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the
Constitution so that its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and
force."6 9 The referent of "this" is not entirely clear. It seems to refer to the
preceding sentence which asserts that the Eighth Amendment's protection of
dignity reflects what our nation was, is, and aspires to be. But how can that
statement about the Eighth Amendment affirm what our "Nation's constant,
unyielding purpose must be"? One is about the meaning of an amendment
and the other is about a nation's purpose. Is our nation's purpose to transmit
contradictory constitutional meanings? That may be the purpose of a
constitutional law professor but not the purpose of a nation.
Even if we have a moral obligation to transmit the meaning of the
Constitution, could it really be our nation's purpose to constantly and
unyieldingly transmit such meaning? Aren't we also permitted to do other
things like go swimming and play chess? It wouldn't be much of a country if
its sole purpose is to remind others of the meaning of our Constitution (and
if it were, given limited knowledge of the Constitution among the populace,
we'd have to deem the project an abject failure).
Perhaps one of our nation's purposes is to transmit the meaning of our
Constitution, but transmitting constitutional meaning seems more like an
opportunity or even a duty rather than a purpose, let alone a constant and
unyielding one. And it's odd to emphasize how we must transmit the meaning
of the Constitution "so that its precepts and guarantees retain their meanings
and force" when the very provision at issue is one whose meaning is meant
69. Id.
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to constantly evolve. I guess we're supposed to constantly remind each other
that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment is constantly evolving. Whatever
exactly the passage means, Kennedy seems to have written purple-mountain-
majestic prose rather than discernably truthful statements.70
4. To Be Memorable
Courts also bullshit to be memorable. Carefully qualified statements can
be boring. Judges make their opinions more memorable and memetic by
cutting out pesky restrictions and limitations.
Example: Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital is one of the most highly-
cited bioethics cases because of a famous passage by then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo concerning the importance of obtaining patient informed consent
prior to a medical or surgical intervention:
Bullshit Candidate: Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body... ..
The passage has been quoted in over 200 cases, 7 2 including several
landmark Supreme Court bioethics decisions. 73 Nevertheless, it's clearly not
true that every adult human has the right to determine what shall be done with
his body. Prisoners do not, nor do those quarantined with contagious
illnesses. And a Supreme Court opinion likely well-known at the time of
70. Nevertheless, scholars still celebrate the parts of the passage that resonate with whatever
they take it to mean. For example, Robert Smith and Zoe Robinson believe the passage
"powerfully" makes the point that "with knowledge and experience, society understands more
fully the consequences of its collective actions; to say that the drafters of the Constitution did not
intend for that experience to be imported into the protections against [invasions of] liberty
misunderstands the enterprise of crafting an enduring Bill of Rights." Robert J. Smith & Zoe
Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression ofPunishment, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 413,
463-64 (2017).
71. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957).
72. Search of the quoted expression, WESTLAWNEXT, https://1.next.westlaw.com
(narrowing search by "all federal & state cases" returns 208 cases as of Mar. 12, 2018).
73. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 803 n.7 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 777 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 799 (1986) (citing Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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Schloendorff gave the government the right to involuntarily vaccinate.74 In
situations like these, the state can do things to the bodies of adults of sound
mind without consent.7 5
Moreover, the quoted passage doesn't speak only of actions taken against
someone's will. If we can "determine what shall be done with" our bodies, it
sounds like we have a right to determine what others do to us in accordance
with our wishes. Yet people seeking physician-assisted suicide do not have
the choice to die with the assistance they'd like in most U.S. states, nor do
people seeking euthanasia in any U.S. state. Similarly, almost no place in the
United States allows adults (of sound mind or otherwise) to hire prostitutes
for sexual services.
But while the passage might be bullshit, it's not the strongest candidate.
Immediately after the semi-colon in the quoted passage it states, "and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages. "76 So, even though the quoted
passage lacks limitations, the context of the statement makes certain
interpretations off limits. We cannot expect judges to list every qualification
of every statement they make. Readers can figure out some qualifications just
from context.
Still, the statement is overbroad, perhaps consciously so. And I think the
overbroad nature of the statement is part of what makes it memorable.
Compare the actual passage to a more qualified version: "Most non-
incarcerated, non-quarantined human beings of adult years and sound mind
have a right to determine what shall be done to their own bodies (though, of
course, they cannot always direct what others must do or are permitted to do
to their bodies)." This version is not nearly as catchy. Had some other judge
written that in 1914, you might never have even seen it, and if you had, you
probably wouldn't have remembered it.
5. To Gloss Over Inconvenient Facts
In law school, students spend most of their time examining legal
arguments. The actual practice of law, however, is quite heavily dependent
on fact-finding. Courts, especially high-level appellate courts, often have the
74. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
75. My statement is qualified at least as to the vaccination example. In Jacobson, the Court
held it lawful to fine Jacobson for refusing to vaccinate but did not address whether he could be
physically compelled to vaccinate. Id.
76. Schloendorff 105 N.E. at 93.
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resources to fact-check their opinions. Sometimes, however, strategic bullshit
papers over inconvenient facts.
Example: Strunk v. Strunk
A 1969 decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals warrants mention for
its brazen bullshit in dissent. In Strunk v. Strunk," the court allowed a
mentally incompetent twenty-seven-year-old ward of the state, said to have
the mental age of a six-year-old, to donate a kidney to his dying brother."
The majority recognized that the brothers had a good relationship and that,
by prolonging his sick brother's life, the ward would benefit from their
continued close connection.7 9 Judge Steinfeld objected in dissent:
Bullshit Candidate: The majority opinion is predicated upon the
finding of the circuit court that there will be psychological benefits
to the ward but points out that the incompetent has the mentality of
a six-year-old child. It is common knowledge beyond dispute that
the loss of a close relative or a friend to a six-year-old child is not
of major impact. Opinions concerning psychological trauma are at
best most nebulous.80
Judge Steinfeld tells us that the death of a loved one has no major impact
on a six-year-old, but I bet millions of hours of psychotherapy sessions would
beg to differ. Furthermore, were a family member killed negligently, I doubt
the judge would dismiss claims brought on behalf of surviving six-year-old
children on the grounds that they did not experience major impact from the
death.
Research on sibling death does indeed point to longstanding harms.'
Granted, the matter may have been less clear in 1969. But even relative to
when it was written, there are four egregious problems with the passage that
collectively make it quite likely to represent bullshit. First, Judge Steinfeld
makes a very counterintuitive assertion as though it is not only fact but
common knowledge and not only common knowledge but common
knowledge "beyond dispute." Second, presumably because it is so beyond
dispute, the court offers no citation for its claim. What the assertion lacks in
77. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
78. Id. at 145-46.
79. Id. at 146-49.
80. Id. at 150 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Jason Fletcher et al., A Sibling Death in the Family: Common and
Consequential, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 803, 817-18, 821 (2013) (finding detrimental effects "of sibling
death with respect to educational attainment, establishing an independent residence, marriage,
employment, and fertility," though surviving sisters were more likely to have such problems than
surviving brothers).
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factual support, it makes up for by implicitly insulting the intelligence of
those who would dare to disagree. After all, what intelligent person would
question a matter that is common knowledge beyond dispute? Indeed, only a
child would be foolish enough to announce that the emperor wears no clothes.
Third, the case concerns not a six-year-old child but a mentally incompetent
twenty-seven-year-old. No single "mental age" can capture the varying
ability levels of a mentally incompetent adult along cognitive and affective
dimensions, and this should have been apparent, even in 1969. Fourth, Judge
Steinfeld claims that "opinions concerning psychological trauma are at best
most nebulous" but ignores the fact that his own assertion that six-year-olds
experience no major impact from the death of a loved one is itself an
"opinion[] concerning psychological trauma." Some skepticism about
psychological conclusions may be perfectly reasonable, but the judge cannot
exempt himself from that very same skepticism. He may be setting a high bar
to justify taking an organ from an incompetent person, but his dissent is
framed as though we'd be foolish to weigh factors any differently than he
does.
In Part I, we saw how bullshit might be used strategically to bolster
judicial discretion in the future, avoid line drawing, sound grand or important,
be memorable, and gloss over inconvenient facts. In Part II, we'll see
additional reasons for judicial bullshit (some of which overlap) and see how
bullshit can be used to broaden the appeal of a landmark opinion that sought
to settle the law surrounding what is still the most controversial bioethics
topic of all.
II. BULLSHIT IN PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
In its 1973 Roe v. Wade decision,8 2 the Supreme Court held that women
have a fundamental right to abortion.83 The Court confronted the central issue
in Roe again in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Though Casey may
have weakened abortion rights relative to Roe, Justices Anthony Kennedy,
Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter wrote a joint opinion that, joined in
part by two others, formed a majority to reaffirm Roe's central holding that
women have a fundamental right to abortion.84 I focus on the joint opinion to
see if the political heat surrounding abortion may have led to some strategic
bullshit.
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Id. at 154.
84. 505 U.S. 833, 843, 853 (1992). Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens
concurred in the reaffirmation of the central holding of Roe. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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Given the contentiousness of the abortion debate and its importance, some
readers may confuse the claim that a passage is bullshit with the claim that
it's bad all things considered. The link between these claims is more tenuous
than it may at first seem. A Justice who ardently supports rights to choose
might best protect those rights with an opinion that cabins those views in
order to maximize support among other Justices and the American public. If
doing so requires bullshit, then some loss of transparency and analytical rigor
may be worthwhile tradeoffs. I will say little about such tradeoffs except to
draw attention to them. My point here is simply that whether you love or hate
the substance of the joint opinion, you can still love or hate its apparent
reliance on bullshit.
A. Rhetorical Flourish in the "Jurisprudence of Doubt" Passage
The joint opinion begins with a reflection on the unsettled nature of
abortion law. Here are the first two sentences:
Bullshit Candidate: Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), that
definition of liberty is still questioned.15
The passage states that liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.
But what is a jurisprudence of doubt? The term "jurisprudence" is more
clearly deployed to speak of the field of study that addresses certain
theoretical or philosophical issues related to law.86 Here, however, the term
refers to a body of law or legal principles, as when people speak of tort law
or contract law jurisprudence. But what area of law is about doubt? What was
actually in doubt was the state of the law concerning reproductive rights. The
joint opinion could have spoken of reproductive rights jurisprudence being in
doubt rather than being of doubt.
Putting aside the Court's peculiar wording, however, its intended meaning
is false or at least hyperbolic. Contra the joint opinion's claim that liberty can
take no refuge in a jurisprudence in doubt, liberty can in fact take some
refuge. Most laws are uncertain to some degree. To the extent abortion rights
were in doubt at the time of Casey, women had weaker liberty to abort. But
weaker liberty is not the same as no liberty. Certainly those women who
aborted during this period had more liberty than those living in countries that
85. Id. at 844 (plurality opinion).
86. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature ofLaw, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/.
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categorically prohibited abortion. And there are limits to how much any
Supreme Court can limit future Supreme Courts. So if liberty finds no refuge
in a jurisprudence containing any amount of doubt, then liberty will find no
refuge after Casey either: abortion jurisprudence is still subject to the whims
of current and future Justices.
Of course, one can easily dismiss the opinion's first sentence as merely a
poor choice of words. But it is the first sentence of one of the most important
opinions of the twentieth century; an opinion that addresses the most heated
political issue of the last several decades and sets out what is still the
governing law on the topic. The authors plausibly sacrificed precision for
strategic reasons.
Indeed, if they were trying to be strategic, they may have succeeded.
Consider how Linda Greenhouse compared a recent abortion rights case to
the "aspirational rhetoric" of Casey in a New York Times op-ed:
There is no poetry in the 40-page opinion [in Whole Woman 's
Health v. Hellerstedt] .... The dry, almost clinical tone could
scarcely be more different from the meditative mood the Supreme
Court struck the last time it stood up for abortion rights, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 24 years ago this week. "Liberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt" was Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy's mysterious opening line in that opinion.17
What the joint opinion sacrificed in precision, it apparently made up for in
devotees. But it's easy to feel ambivalent about the tradeoff. Even
Greenhouse seems ambivalent by the end of her piece:
[Later,] I realized that while the court in Casey called upon "the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution," it didn't really work out. Maybe, after all, this is not
a moment for poetry, but for facts."
In dissent, Justice Scalia called out the joint opinion for its "jurisprudence
of doubt" claim. He argued that the "undue burden" standard put forward by
the joint opinion is so hard to pin down that it creates more doubt than we
87. Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win Out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html. Justice
Scalia, by contrast, was critical of the length and "epic tone" of the joint opinion which "suggest
that its authors believe they are bringing to an end a troublesome era in the history of our Nation
and of our Court." Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
88. Greenhouse, supra note 87.
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had under Roe.89 Hence, Scalia retorted, "[r]eason finds no refuge in this
jurisprudence of confusion."9 0 By contrast, I take the joint opinion's
discussion of "doubt" to refer, first and foremost, to reduced doubts about the
viability of the fundamental right to abortion, and on that score the authors
succeeded (even if Scalia is right that the authors sowed confusion over the
detailed implementation of the right). Whatever your take is on this debate,
however, some judicial misstatements and indiscretions aren't bullshit;
they're just generic mistakes. The joint opinion authors were not obviously
bullshitting about their efforts to reduce doubt.
The second sentence in our bullshit candidate passage references Roe's
holding that abortion is a fundamental right and then states that "that
definition of liberty is still questioned." But the holding of Roe is not a
"definition" of liberty. A definition of liberty would describe what we mean
by the word "liberty." So while Roe's holding describes an aspect of our
liberty under the Constitution, it is certainly not a definition of it. What the
authors seem to mean is not that some definition of liberty is in doubt but
rather that the validity of the Court's holding in Roe is in doubt. That more
transparent description, however, reveals a less majestic, less powerful Court
whose holdings can be questioned. Hazy talk of a definition of liberty
downplays the limits of the Court's power.
B. Our Hands Are Tied in "Some of Us Find Abortion Offensive"
Passage
The joint opinion addresses what I take to be one of the most important
issues in all of jurisprudence: to what extent should judges allow their moral
beliefs to influence their legal decisions? The authors would have us believe
that there is a clear distinction between law and morality, and theirjob is only
to consider the law. This is a view the Supreme Court repeatedly tries to make
us believe, 91 and so variations on this bullshit can be found all over the place:
Bullshit Candidate: Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot
89. Casey, 505 U.S. at 984-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
90. Id. at 993.
91. Cf Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-
Legislature, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1601, 1601 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court acts as a "kind
of super-legislature" that "essentially makes its final choice among the legally viable options
based on the moral and political values of the Justices, and not simply on the basis of legally
binding standards").
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control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code.92
I cannot argue in detail here why the passage is hard to take seriously. But
let me hint at some reasons. A judge might try her best to avoid mixing law
and morality by trying to resolve a case at bar solely in terms of the law. But
as any first-year law student should recognize, the law underdetermines the
answer to many disputes, especially in major constitutional law cases such as
Casey. So judges inevitably fill in the gaps with their moral beliefs or
personal preferences. Judge Richard Posner has rather candidly admitted to
it: "I pay very little attention to legal rules, statutes, constitutional
provisions .... A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask
yourself-forget about the law-what is a sensible resolution of this
dispute?"9 3 But even if Posner took more liberties than most judges, surely
all judges fall somewhere on a spectrum as to their willingness to permit their
moral beliefs or personal preferences to influence their decisions.
Indeed, if Brian Leiter is right, the moral beliefs (or personal preferences)
of Justices are so important to their decisions that they ought to be addressed
more explicitly in confirmation hearings because "political and legal
insiders" know how much these views influence decisions:
[A]ll political actors know that the Supreme Court often operates as
a super-legislature, and thus that the moral and political views of
Justices are decisive criteria for their appointment. This almost
banal truth is, however, rarely discussed in the public confirmation
process, but is common knowledge among political and legal
insiders.94
If political and legal insiders know all of this, and surely the joint opinion
writers are legal insiders, then there's reason to think that the Justices were
either lying or at least bullshitting. Moreover, even if the Justices could truly
prevent their personal views from dictating their legal decisions, as they
suggest in the passage above, they have presumably used their moral code in
so limiting their personal views. For on some moral views, it would be
immoral not to use one's powers to influence such an important decision.
Sometimes we can fill in legal gaps not with personal or moral views but
with predictions about how we think judges would decide an issue. A lawyer
advising state legislatures about the constitutionality of abortion laws a year
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
93. Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with RichardPosner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/1 1/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-
retirement.html.
94. Leiter, supra note 91, at 1602.
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prior to Casey could surely make predictions about the views of appellate
judges. But even if lawyers can make predictions to advise clients and even
if lower court judges can predict what appellate judges will do, Supreme
Court Justices can't rely on predictions in the same way, especially in a case
like Casey in which a single Justice can sway the outcome. A Justice cannot
plausibly say, "I need to decide what the law is on abortion, so let me predict
how I will in fact decide the case."
So, if Supreme Court Justices are not deciding by prediction, what are they
doing? If you agree that existing law underdetermines the answer (and even
if you don't agree as to abortion you are likely to agree in general), then you
will likely agree that if judges are not deciding on purely self-interested
grounds, they are deciding at least in part on moral grounds. Thus, it's hard
to believe that the Justices are truly deciding Casey without appeal to their
own moral codes.
The very wording in the joint opinion hints at the authors' bullshit where
they state that their job is "to define the liberty of all." While language use
varies, if a judge is merely determining the scope of a right under the law, we
wouldn't ordinarily say the judge is defining liberty. One who defines a
liberty seems to be to be one who takes on a legislative role; a role that is
supposed to include direct consideration of moral issues.
Perhaps when the joint opinion authors state that their principles of
morality "cannot control [their] decision," they mean that those principles can
influence their decision but not be the sole determining factor. Such an
admission, however, would mean that the Justices might well be allowing
their moral views to substantially influence their decisions-a fact they are
likely loath to admit and happy to bury between the lines. Thus, it seems that
the joint opinion authors either never thought carefully about the passage or
are deliberately projecting an unrealistic air of legalistic detachment from the
controversial topic of abortion for fear of seeming partisan.
C. Hide Arbitrariness ofLine Drawing in "Viability" Passage
The core bioethical question raised by Casey concerns when an entity is
entitled to a right to life. Some think an embryo is ensouled at formation and
immediately has a right to life. Others would grant a right to life at viability
or birth. And some, including perhaps the joint opinion authors, believe that
rights to life develop gradually as an embryo matures into a fetus and then an
infant. 95
95. See Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, supra note 52, at 282-86.
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Recognizing that Roe permitted states to ban abortion entirely at the time
of fetal viability, the joint opinion sought to offer a principled justification
for drawing the same line. Aside from stare decisis, however, the Court had
trouble mustering any substantive justification in favor of viability:
Bullshit Candidate: [T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe,
is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman. Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures
may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of
offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the
lines we draw. And there is no line other than viability which is
more workable. To be sure, as we have said, there may be some
medical developments that affect the precise point of viability, but
this is an imprecision within tolerable limits given that the medical
community and all those who must apply its discoveries will
continue to explore the matter.96
If you carefully reread the prior passage, you'll see that it actually offers
no moral justification whatsoever. It contains only the conclusory assertion
that a realistic possibility of surviving outside the womb gives the state the
right to override a woman's rights. Whatever you think of viability as a
sensible place to cut off a mother's abortion right, you won't find a moral
justification for it in this passage, a point that is seized on by Justice Scalia in
dissent.97
Immediately after the candidate passage, the authors write: "The viability
line also has, as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense
it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented
to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child." 98 Interestingly,
this remark begins with "also" and "as a practical matter," so as to imply that
the authors have already given a reason, presumably a theoretical reason, in
defense of their position, even though no such reason can be found on careful
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 989 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The arbitrariness of
the viability line is confirmed by the Court's inability to offer any justification for it beyond the
conclusory assertion that it is only at that point that the unborn child's life 'can in reason and all
fairness' be thought to override the interests of the mother. Precisely why is it that, at the magical
second when machines currently in use (though not necessarily available to the particular woman)
are able to keep an unborn child alive apart from its mother, the creature is suddenly able (under
our Constitution) to be protected by law, whereas before that magical second it was not? That
makes no more sense than according infants legal protection only after the point when they can
feed themselves." (citations omitted)).
98. Id. at 870 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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reading. But at least this second remark about viability adds some substance.
It asserts that the viability line is fair to the extent that a woman could be said
at that point to have consented to the loss of the abortion right by not having
previously exercised it.
The assertion, however, is never defended. It's not as though a woman
knows precisely when a baby becomes viable (after all, doctors don't always
know and the line has been shifting for decades). Moreover, any well-
publicized date, so long as it is after a woman is aware she is pregnant would
have a mere "element of fairness." Unfortunately, women don't always know
when they are pregnant and the quality of whatever consent is deemed
implicit only improves as more time elapses. So if viability plus one day
benefits from some sort of implicit consent, viability plus two days will have
only clearer indicia of consent and so on the more time that elapses. If the
authors really wanted to draw lines surrounding consent, it would make more
sense to start with actual research (or to call for research) into how women
typically perceive their rights and obligations as pregnancies progress. But
the authors seem happy to adopt viability as the pertinent cutoff merely
because it has "an element of fairness," even though other dates might be
fairer still.
It takes more than just inadequate reasoning, however, to label a passage
as bullshit. And to be sure, the Court is addressing a very hard question. What
makes this passage possible bullshit is that the authors assert that judges have
to offer a justification for the lines they draw, thereby implying that they are
offering a justification. Yet they really say nothing that could qualify as a
justification. Not only do they not offer a justification, they do not offer one
that is true "in reason and all fairness," except for baldly asserting that it is
true in reason and all fairness.
None of this means that viability is the wrong place to draw the line. It
simply means that the authors failed to offer a plausible justification for
drawing the legal line where they did but created the illusion that they had.
Of course, there may not be a strong justification for any particular line, but
a line ought nevertheless be drawn. In that case, a court could transparently
admit the arbitrariness of the line-drawing process rather than take great pains
to emphasize the high quality of its non-existent argument.
In Part I, I used McFall v. Shimp to illustrate how courts bullshit to avoid
line drawing. There, the court took a matter that could fall on a spectrum but
arguably used bullshit to make it seem like it did not. In Casey, the Justices
used the opposite strategy. In trying to determine when a human is entitled to
a right to life, the joint opinion authors treated the matter as falling on a
spectrum and purported to find an appropriate place to draw the line. To
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justify their decision, however, they made bald assertions to artificially
enhance confidence in the location of the line they selected.
D. Metabullshit in Plessy Passage
One way the joint opinion seeks to deflect responsibility, quite
appropriately perhaps, is by relying on Roe v. Wade as precedent. In doing
so, the joint opinion spends considerable time discussing when a watershed
decision can be overturned.9 9 In part of that discussion, the joint opinion looks
at two watershed decisions that were overturned and explains why Roe does
not warrant the same treatment.
The authors focus first on the infamous and influential decision in Lochner
v. New York' which identified a constitutional right to freedom of
contract.' 0 ' That decision was overturned, we're told, because it led to cases
such as Adkins v. Children 's Hospital which found that a federal minimum
wage law for women violated constitutional rights to freedom of contract.1 02
The Depression taught "the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most people
by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins
rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a
relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."1 03
Furthermore, facts that "had premised a constitutional resolution of social
controversy had proven to be untrue, and history's demonstration of their
untruth not only justified but required"1 04 the Court to overrule Lochner.
The joint opinion also tries to explain why the 1954 decision in Brown v.
Board of Educationo to overrule the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson106
was inapposite in Casey.'07 In holding that separate is not equal, 0 Brown did
not overrule Plessy simply because facts changed. The joint opinion does not
assert that separate was equal in Plessy but was no longer equal in Brown.
That might imply that Plessy was correct when decided, and the authors make
clear that "Plessy was wrong the day it was decided."1 09 They claim that what
changed in Brown was the way the Court perceived the relevant facts:
99. Id. at 854-69.
100. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
101. Id. at 53.
102. 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923).
103. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62.
104. Id. at 862.
105. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
106. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
107. 505 U.S. at 862-69.
108. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
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Bullshit Candidate: Society's understanding ofthe facts upon which
a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally
different from the basis claimed for the decision in 1896. While we
think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, we must also
recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the
decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only
justified but required.
West Coast Hotel [which overruled Lochner] and Brown each rested
on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which
furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court's response
to facts that the country could understand, or had come to
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own
declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive. As the
decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible, not
merely as the victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint
of numbers (victories though they were), but as applications of
constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the
Court before.!"
Despite efforts to suggest the contrary, the joint opinion fails to adequately
explain why Lochner was overruled because of a change in facts rather than,
as in Plessy, a change in perceptions of facts. Nothing in the opinion states
that, over time, markets changed the way they functioned. Hence, both
Lochner and Plessy seem to have been overruled because of misperceptions
of facts. This is important because if a precedent can be overruled not because
of a change in facts but a change in the perception of facts, Roe opponents
will argue that Roe should be overturned as well due to misperceptions. To
them, Casey offered an opportunity to correct these misperceptions. In their
minds, the fact that Brown represented an "application[] of constitutional
principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before""' does
nothing to normatively distinguish the Plessy-Brown context from the Roe-
Casey context." 2
110. Id. at 863-64 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 864.
112. As Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses in dissent: "It appears to us very odd indeed that
the joint opinion chooses as benchmarks two cases in which the Court chose not to adhere to
erroneous constitutional precedent, but instead enhanced its stature by acknowledging and
correcting its error, apparently in violation of the joint opinion's 'legitimacy' principle." Id. at
959. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 961 (arguing that the
doctrinal shift accomplished in West Coast Hotel was attributed by the Court to a change in its
view about the Constitution, not about economics).
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Perhaps the joint opinion authors believed that societal changes in
perceptions were more dramatic in the overturning of Lochner and Plessy
than in the potential overturning of Roe, but that seems inconsistent with the
authors' view that Plessy was wrong when it was decided. If Plessy was
wrong when it was decided, it was wrong before societal perceptions shifted.
Thus, the candidate passage is perhaps showing insufficient concern for the
difference between facts and the perception of facts and insufficient concern
as to whether changes in perceptions of facts can serve to meaningfully
distinguish Casey from predecessor cases.
If the passage is viewed as bullshit, the broader section in which it appears
may represent metabullshit. For in nearby discussion, the Court seems
suspicious of the genuineness of the argument in Plessy. After describing the
Plessy Court's stated view that facilities can be both separate and equal, the
joint opinion implicitly raises the question of "[w]hether, as a matter of
historical fact, the Justices in the Plessy majority believed this or not.""3
Hence, the authors are suggesting that the Plessy majority may have lied or
bullshitted when it asserted that separate is equal. In other words, sections of
the joint opinion may constitute metabullshit: bullshit that complains about
bullshit by earlier Courts." 4
E. Seeming Especially Principled in "Legitimacy" Passage
The joint opinion makes the further argument that its approach is not only
consistent with stare decisis but that a contrary conclusion "would seriously
weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as
113. Id. at 862 (plurality opinion).
114. Alternatively, the Court in Plessy might have been lying rather than bullshitting,
depending perhaps on how you interpret Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent implying
that the Justices in the majority might have been "wanting in candor":
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate
against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored
citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that
the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. Railroad
corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in the
matter of accommodation for travelers. The thing to accomplish was, under
the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the
latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No
one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 556-57 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.""' The reason,
the authors assert, is that:
Bullshit Candidate: The Court's power lies ... in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law
means and to declare what it demands.
... The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the
warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution and the lesser
sources of legal principle on which the Court draws. That substance
is expressed in the Court's opinions, and our contemporary
understanding is such that a decision without principled justification
would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is
furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required.
Because not every conscientious claim of principled justification
will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be beyond
dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that
allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with
social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the
principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the
Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions
under circumstances in which their principled character is
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation."16
As a preliminary matter, the claim that the Court's power depends on its
substantive legitimacy is false, except quite indirectly. A court's power lies
not in its actual legitimacy but in perceptions of its legitimacy. Suppose, for
example, that a duly elected President of the United States is secretly
murdered by his heretofore unknown identical twin. If the twin takes the
place of the legitimate president, the twin will have as much power as the
legitimate president would have had, despite his illegitimacy, so long as he is
perceived as legitimate. The joint opinion appropriately goes on to discuss
perceptions of legitimacy, but the claim that power depends on actual
legitimacy is arguably fairly subtle bullshit: it makes the joint opinion seem
more principled and less conniving.
An even clearer instance of bullshit is the joint opinion's claim that "a
decision without principled justification would be no judicial act at all."
Surely judges have made unprincipled determinations in the past. Do authors
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
116. Id. at 865-66.
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of the joint opinion really believe that these judges' determinations were not
judicial acts? The authors have already said that they believe Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided. But it is hard to believe that Plessy did not
involve a judicial act. In other words, the authors seem to stake out a very
non-positivist understanding of what a judicial act is"-7 one that I doubt they
actually take seriously, making it a prime candidate for the bullshit label.
The quoted passage is also noteworthy for the constantly shifting standard
to which the Supreme Court is said to be held. First it says that the
justification claimed by the Court "must be beyond dispute," but that's clearly
an unrealistic standard. The authors surely knew at publication that their own
colleagues on the Court were dissenting, making it hard to believe the authors
intended such a high bar. Indeed, two sentences later, the authors state that
the principled character of their decisions must be "sufficiently plausible to
be accepted by the nation." So they quickly downgraded their obligation from
justification beyond dispute to justification that is sufficiently plausible.
That's a big change in a small amount of ink.
Finally, let's return to the overall role of bullshit in Casey. One might
expect an opinion about abortion rights to address issues such as: what
entitles an entity to a right to life? When in our development from an embryo
to a corpse are we entitled to such rights? Yet, for good reason, the joint
opinion says little about these topics of fundamental importance: they know
the authors cannot rest their abortion rights opinion on their philosophical
prowess, for even professional philosophers lack the prowess to write about
abortion in a way that will satisfy the masses. Hence, the joint opinion fills
the void with strategic bullshit: the authors wax philosophical even when the
content of their message is unclear, argue that stare decisis ties their hands,
cloak their line drawing with a non-existent justification, and try to seem
more principled than perhaps they really are.
That said, it's not obvious that the opinion would necessarily be better
without all the bullshit. If long-time court follower Linda Greenhouse was
enraptured by the authors' "poetry,""' we can expect that many others were
too. And the advantages of writing poetry over hardcore philosophical
analysis are abundantly clear when dealing with an issue as controversial and
destined-to-disappoint as abortion: when you can't provide careful, precise
philosophical answers, razzle and dazzle the crowd. If you believe that
women should have a right to abort, then you may well find razzle and dazzle
117. See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 228, 229 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (stating
that the "central tenet" of positivism according to H.L.A. Hart is "that there is a difference
between the way the law is and the way it ought to be").
118. Greenhouse, supra note 87.
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better than flat and unsatisfying when razzle and dazzle are required to
generate a coalition. We can save "flat and unsatisfying" for scholars.
The need to build coalitions points to an important reason we might
forgive judges for writing about bioethical topics with less care than analytic
philosophers. Few traditional papers in philosophy are written by more than
one or two authors. By contrast, judges often need to convince other judges
to join an opinion (or not overrule an opinion). U.S. Supreme Court cases are
usually heard by nine Justices, and the need to repeatedly edit opinions to
develop coalitions may well prove particularly bullshit conducive. Justices
may settle for a Frankensteinian mass of words because they care more about
reaching what they perceive as the best ultimate result than reaching the best-
explained result. Some supreme judicial bullshit may be an unfortunate side
effect of trying to dispense justice by committee.
CONCLUSION
I have given numerous instances of "candidate" bullshit. It's hard to be
more definitive than that since we cannot easily read judges' minds, and
Frankfurt's test of bullshit requires us to. In some examples I give, judges
probably were not bullshitting; they just slipped up in one way or another. In
others, judges probably were bullshitting: they knowingly wrote with
inadequate attention to the truth or falsity of what they were communicating
while recognizing at some level that they were doing so.
The most important value jeopardized by judicial bullshit is truth. Bullshit
is insufficiently concerned with truth, so it risks reducing our knowledge of
how the world really is. While asking judges for truth may be unrealistic,
especially in heated bioethics cases, we can still demand transparency. When
courts are unsure, better perhaps that they admit their limitations than
obfuscate with flowery or confusing language.
On the other hand, some important values counsel against flat prohibitions
on judicial bullshit. Bullshit can build consensus. Even if people won't agree
on the values and metaphysical premises underlying some substantive issue,
they may agree to bullshit that has multiple interpretations each of which
pleases a different constituency. Bullshit can also bolster confidence in some
conclusion. We sometimes mistake hard-to-understand prose for deep and
meaningful prose. The boost in confidence may be illusory but perhaps some
illusions are valuable nonetheless. (Bullshit may also be a scare resource: the
more it's used, the more reason we have to identify it as such, thereby
weakening its ability to build consensus and bolster confidence.)
Some empirical inquiries could shed important light on the relative merits
and demerits of bullshit. How often do judges bullshit and for which reasons?
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Is it more common in certain areas of law? Do some judges do it more often
than others? What distinguishes judges who frequently bullshit from those
who don't? Answers to such questions might help us determine if bullshit
should be frowned upon always, never, or on a case-by-case basis.
In short, ifjustice is principally about reaching the right result, maybe it's
okay for judges to bullshit strategically. But if justice is principally about
democratic transparency and reaching the right result for the right reasons,
bullshit is more suspect. I can only hope to have offered food for thought on
these deeper questions.

